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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the interaction of ﬁscal stabilization policies in the
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The “Excessive Deﬁcits” Procedure
of the Maastricht Treaty and its elaborations in the recent “Stability and
Growth Pact” introduce a set of ﬁscal stringency requirements on national
ﬁscal policies. Situations might arise where the need for ﬁscal ﬂexibility
and the ﬁscal stringency requirements will create a conﬂict and suboptimal
macroeconomic policies are implemented. We analyze macroeconomic ad-
justment under non-cooperative and cooperative ﬁscal policy design in the
EMU using a dynamic games approach. In particular we consider how ﬁscal
stringency requirements like the Stability and Growth Pact aﬀect ﬁscal pol-
icy design under EMU and study the consequences of the introduction of a
ﬁscal transfer mechanism between countries.
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21 Introduction
In the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the participating countries
loose monetary and exchange rate policies as macroeconomic policy instru-
ments. The EMU implies a considerable change in the design of macroeco-
nomic policies, both at the national and the supranational level. Monetary
policy design is transferred to the European Central Bank (ECB) that im-
plements the common monetary policy and circulates the common currency,
the Euro. The monetary policies of the ECB are mainly directed at price
stability in the EU and maintaining a stable external value of the Euro. In
the short and medium term, the burden of ﬁscal stabilization primarily rests
on the national ﬁscal authorities given also the small size of the federal EU
budget. This situation is likely to increase the need for ﬁscal policy activism
when countries face a recession.
A ﬁrst important issue regarding ﬁscal policy design in the EMU concerns
the need for ﬁscal policy coordination. EMU aﬀects both the interaction of
ﬁscal policies and their transmission in the EU economies. Given the high
degree of economic interdependence in the EU, important externalities from
national ﬁscal policies exist. Coordination of national ﬁscal policies enables
to internalize these externalities and by that to improve macroeconomic per-
formance compared to non-cooperative ﬁscal policy design in the EMU.
A second important issue concerns the imposed ﬁscal stringency requirements
by the “Excessive Deﬁcits Procedure” of the Maastricht Treaty and its de-
tailed elaboration convened in the “Stability and Growth Pact” (Stability
Pact in short) that was signed at the June 1997 Amsterdam summit of the
Council of EU ministers. It imposes a set of restrictions on ﬁscal ﬂexibility
under EMU. The Stability Pact has a double role: (i) a preventive role of
early warning against excessive budget deﬁcits (budget surveillance), and (ii)
a penalizing role for sustained budget shortages. The medium term goal is
approximate budget equilibrium or budget surplus. It was motivated by the
fear that undisciplined ﬁscal behavior is likely to put at risk the low inﬂa-
tion commitment of the ECB since it will be diﬃcult to rule out a monetary
bail-out by the ECB under all circumstances. Undisciplined ﬁscal behavior
may also result in ﬁscal bail-outs through ﬁscal transfers in the EU. Finally,
excessive deﬁcits could induce upward pressure on interest rates and an ap-
preciation of the Euro. In both cases, pressure on the ECB could arise to
ease its monetary policy. In all cases, the burdens associated with individual
ﬁscal indiscipline will partly be transmitted to the other EU countries.
3Situations, however, may arise where the need for greater ﬁscal ﬂexibility and
the greater ﬁscal stringency will create a conﬂict and suboptimal macroeco-
nomic policies will be pursued. This paper analyzes the interaction of ﬁscal
policies in the EMU and shows how ﬁscal stringency criteria like the Stability
Pact aﬀect this interaction and macroeconomic adjustment. To do so, we an-
alyze outcomes in two diﬀerent game-theoretic settings: (i) non-cooperative
ﬁscal policy design and (ii) cooperative ﬁscal policy design. We also analyze
how policies and adjustment are aﬀected in both regimes by externally im-
posed ﬁscal stringency measures and consider the case for a European ﬁscal
transfer system.
To model the design of ﬁscal stabilization policies under EMU, we introduce
a dynamic two-country model of the EMU that features short term nominal
rigidities thus creating scope for active stabilization policies. Our analysis
builds on earlier work by Turnovsky, Ba¸ sar and d’Orey (1988) and Neck and
Dockner (1995) who analyze the interaction of monetary authorities in a sim-
ilar dynamic two country model. In both papers, the monetary policies of
the two countries aﬀect short-term output in both the domestic and foreign
economies. The interdependencies of the economies, hence, creates a dy-
namic conﬂict between the two monetary authorities. Output, inﬂation and
exchange rate adjustment and their implications for social welfare are cal-
culated for a number of diﬀerent modes of strategic interaction. We extend
these two-country models into a setting of a monetary union and consider the
eﬀects of ﬁscal policy in such a setting of a monetary union and analyze the
eﬀects of ﬁscal stringency conditions and ﬁscal transfers on the outcomes. In
order to be able to derive analytical properties of the model we concentrate
on open-loop strategies in the dynamic game between the ﬁscal players.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 develops the analytical frame-
work, section 3 analyzes non-cooperative and cooperative ﬁscal policies under
EMU, section 4 presents numerical simulations of the model to illustrate its
main characteristics, and the ﬁnal section concludes.
2 A Dynamic Stabilization Game in the EMU
Consider a situation where a two-country EMU has been fully implemented,
implying that national currencies have been replaced by a common currency,
national central banks by the ECB and that the internal exchange rate has
disappeared as an adjustment instrument. Furthermore assume that capital
4markets are fully integrated and that there are no country-risk premia imply-
ing that any interest diﬀerential is arbitraged away instantaneously. On the
other hand assume that there is no labor mobility between both EMU parts
and that goods and labor market adjust sluggishly. That is, the economies
display Keynesian features in the short-run.
We model this economic structure of a two-country EMU by the following
equations,
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in which, y, denotes real output, p, the output price level, iE, the common
nominal interest rate and, ir, the real interest rate. s measures competi-
tiveness of country 1 vis-` a-vis country 2 and is deﬁned as the output price
diﬀerential. f, equals the real ﬁscal deﬁcit that the ﬁscal authority sets. m
denotes the amount of nominal money balances that the public demands.
Except for the nominal interest rate and the rate of inﬂation, ˙ p, variables are
in logarithms and expressed as deviations from their long-run non-inﬂationary
equilibrium (growth path). The model, therefore, characterizes the business
cycles in this two-country EMU. Variables of country 2 are indicated with
an asterisk. For simplicity, we assume that both countries are symmetric
in their structural model parameters and we ignore the interaction of this
two-country EMU with the rest of the world.
(1) is the aggregate demand function having intra-EU competitiveness, the
real interest rate, foreign output and the ﬁscal deﬁcit as arguments. (3) de-
ﬁnes the competitiveness of the EMU countries relative to each other. The
5deﬁnition of the real interest rate is given in (4). The demand for real bal-
ances of the common currency is given in (6) as a function of output and the
common nominal interest rate. We assume that its interest targeting policy
enables the ECB to have perfect control over the nominal common interest
rate, iE(t). Given our focus on ﬁscal policies, we assume in the remainder
that the ECB pursues a ﬁxed interest rate policy implying iE(t)=¯ iE.N o t e ,
however, that also alternative interest rate rules like a Taylor rule could be
introduced. (8), ﬁnally, gives the short run relation between inﬂation and
output, along the Phillips curve. Because of the nominal rigidities, implied
by the Phillips curve, output and prices can diverge from their equilibrium
values in the short run. In the long run, on the other hand, both economies
adjust to a long run equilibrium where output and prices are at their equi-
librium values (which have been normalized to zero in this analysis).
Both economies are connected by a number of channels through which price
and output ﬂuctuations in one part transmit themselves to the other part of
the EMU. Output ﬂuctuations in both economies transmit themselves partly
to the other EMU country through the import channel. Therefore, the rel-
ative openness of both economies, as measured by ρ, implies an important
interdependence of both economies. Price ﬂuctuations in the domestic or
foreign economy aﬀect intra-EU competitiveness, s(t), and therefore output
in both economies. Combining (1)-(9), enables to write output in both coun-
tries as a function of competitiveness, the policy instrument of the ECB,
















k2−ρ2, b := δ
k+ρ, c :=
γ
k−ρ and k := 1 − γξ. Substituting (10) and
(11) into (8) and (9) yields two ﬁrst-order linear diﬀerential equations in the
output price levels. Subtracting them from each other gives the dynamics of
intra-EU competitiveness,
˙ s(t)=φ1f
∗(t) − φ1f(t)+φ2s(t) (12)
with φ1 :=
ξη
k+ρ and φ2 := −
2δξ
k+ρ.
Having modeled the economies of both EMU countries and derived the ad-
justment dynamics of output and prices over time, we still need to determine
6the ﬁscal policies and their dynamic adjustment over time as a consequence
of the diﬀerent modes of interaction of these macroeconomic policymakers.
In order to do so, we need to specify the objective functions of the players.
The objectives are optimized subject to the dynamics of s in (12). We assume
that the players have quadratic objective functions. The dynamic strategic
interaction of the policymakers in that case reduces to a linear-quadratic
(LQ) diﬀerential game.
In particular, both ﬁscal authorities seek to minimize the following intertem-
poral loss functions that are assumed to be quadratic in the rate of inﬂation,























Future losses are discounted at a rate θ. The costs of price and output ﬂuc-
tuations are standard in most analysis of macroeconomic policy design. The
assumption that the ﬁscal authorities also value budget balance reﬂects the
notion that high deﬁcits, while beneﬁcial to stimulate domestic output, are
not costless: they to some extent crowd out private investment and lead to
debt accumulation. Deﬁcits in the loss function also features the possibility
that excessive deﬁcits in the EMU will be subject to sanctions, as proposed
in the Stability Pact. Therefore, countries prefer low ﬁscal deﬁcits, ceteris
paribus, to high ﬁscal deﬁcits. In case where χ →∞ , (cyclical) budget bal-
ance becomes the sole objective of the ﬁscal authority and ﬁscal activism
is reduced accordingly. On the other hand, χ → 0, implies that ﬁscal strin-
gency is minimal and that the ﬁscal authorities have maximal ﬁscal ﬂexibility
under EMU.
We consider the dynamic adjustment process caused by an initial disequi-
librium in intra-EU competitiveness, implying that s(0)  = 0. This initial
disequilibrium causes asymmetric adjustment of output, prices and optimal
policies in the adjustment towards equilibrium. We analyze how ﬁscal poli-
cies adjust over time as a result of the dynamic interaction between the
macroeconomic policymakers in the EMU. In this dynamic interaction we
focus on the diﬀerent adjustment patterns that arise under non-cooperative
and cooperative ﬁscal policy design in the EMU and how these patterns are
aﬀected by diﬀerent degrees of ﬁscal stringency and the introduction of a
federal ﬁscal transfer system. As mentioned in the introduction, we focus
7on the open-loop strategies of this game in order to be able to derive some
analytical results in the next section.
3 Non-cooperative versus Cooperative Fiscal
Policies in the EMU
3.1 The non-cooperative case
We ﬁrst analyze the design of ﬁscal policy in the EMU if the ﬁscal authorities
implement non-cooperative ﬁscal policy strategies. In a Nash equilibrium
setting the players implement their optimal strategies simultaneously. The

















































































in which Qi,P i,L i,N i and Rii, (i =1 ,2), represent submatrices that are given
in Appendix I.
8Using the symbolic computational program Mathematica, it is shown in Ap-
pendix I that (depending on the sign of the λi’s, see (22)) either the game








where i equals 1 or 2. λ is the adjustment speed of the output price diﬀeren-
tial, s(t), towards its long-run equilibrium value zero. In other words if the
game has a solution then, in principle, two diﬀerent adjustment schemes of
the closed-loop system (16) towards its long-term equilibrium can occur. As-












by χ2, the next table illustrates the possibilities
Table 2
# equilibria parametervalues
1 r ≤ 1
0 χ1 <χ<χ 2, r>1
1 χ ≤ min(χ1,χ 2), r>1
1 χ ≥ max(χ1,χ 2), r>1
2 χ2 <χ<χ 1, r>1
Given our model we expect, normally, that k>ρwill hold. In that case,
the domestic ﬁscal instrument has a stronger impact on domestic output
than the foreign ﬁscal instrument (see 10). That is, r ≤ 1 and therefore the
closed-loop adjustment scheme will be uniquely determined. In the following
Figure 1 we illustrated the situations that can occur in case k<ρ
0 χ1 χ2 χ
10 1 #e q .
0 χ2 χ1 χ
12 1 #e q .
Figure 1
9In particular note that if ρ is much larger than k the situation occurs that the
game permits two diﬀerent types of adjustment schemes for the closed-loop
system if χ is chosen ”appropriately”. Which adjustment scheme actually
will occur under these circumstances depends on additional requirements
which are imposed on the outcome of the game. A natural choice seems to
select that outcome of the game that increases the adjustment scheme for the
closed-loop system towards its long-term equilibrium most. For, under such
an adjustment scheme also unanticipated shocks to the system are dealt
with best. Furthermore, this equilibrium seems to be a natural candidate
that may be Pareto eﬃcient (that is both players infer lower cost by playing
this equilibrium). However, given the fact that we expect this to be a rare
situation, we do not elaborate this subject here.
Finally note that the state variable s in the closed-loop system (16) does
not depend directly on the value of iE. This variable iE has only an indirect
inﬂuence on the closed-loop dynamics of the model, that is via the parameters
in the cost functionals.
3.2 The Cooperative Case
The various interdependencies and spillovers between the two countries are
not internalized if countries decide upon ﬁscal policies in a non-cooperative
manner. In our case, national ﬁscal policies combined with initial disequi-
libria in intra-EU competitiveness imply important externalities. Domestic
ﬁscal policies also impact on foreign output through the import channel. Any
initial disequilibrium in intra-EU competitiveness, however, implies that both
countries have opposite optimal policies. Therefore, national ﬁscal policy
-while fostering domestic adjustment- at the same time increases the adjust-
ment burden in the other economy. Coordination can help to reduce the
working of such externalities caused by national ﬁscal policies in the pres-
ence of an initial disequilibrium in intra-EU competitiveness. Therefore, it
is important to compare ﬁscal policies and macroeconomic outcomes under
non-cooperative equilibria with outcomes under cooperation. The impor-
tance of surveillance and coordination of macroeconomic policies in the EU
is stressed in the Maastricht Treaty which requires member states to regard
their macroeconomic policies as a “matter of common concern” and to co-
ordinate these within the Council of Ministers. In these ECOFIN meetings
coordination and surveillance of macroeconomic policies has now been insti-
10tutionalized.
Under cooperation ﬁscal policies are directed at minimizing a joined loss






where ω is the Pareto constant that measures the relative weight attached
to the losses of both players. One could assume that it is the outcome of
an earlier bargaining problem that the two players have solved to determine
the relative weights of the individual objectives in the cooperative design of
ﬁscal policies. In that case the Nash-bargaining solution could be considered
as the most natural outcome to such a bargaining problem associated with
the cooperative decision making process.
We can rewrite the cooperative decision making problem in the standard
























x(0) = x0, (18)






in which Q,R and S represent 2x2 sub matrices that are given in Appendix
II. Proceeding as before we use the Hamiltonian approach to calculate the
optimal strategy (see Appendix II). After some lengthy calculations we ﬁnd








where the adjustment speed λ is the positive square root that follows di-
rectly from (25) in Appendix II and v is a (in general non-zero) parameter
that depends on the system parameters. Note that, diﬀerent from the non-
cooperative case, the variable iE now has a direct impact on the closed-loop
dynamics of the system.
11Taking a closer look at λ as a function of the relative weight parameter ω,
we see that it can be written as:
λ =
       ν1ω + ν2(1 + ω)2 − ν3(1 + ω2)
ν4ω + ν5(1 + ω)2 ,
where νi are positive constants (see Appendix V, Table 6). Diﬀerentiation of







(1 − ω2)(ν1ν5 − ν2ν4 + ν3ν4 +2 ν5ν3)
(ν4ω + ν5(1 + ω)2)2 .
So, we conclude that, ceteris paribus, λ is maximized for ω =1i nc a s e
ν := ν1ν5 − ν2ν4 + ν3ν4 +2 ν5ν3 is positive, and that λ is minimal for
ω =1i nc a s eν<0. In Appendix III we show that ν<0i fa n do n l y
if (2ar(φ2 − 1
2η) − bφ1)(a2µ(r2 − 1) − χ) − 2a2bφ1µr(r +1 )> 0.

















From this Figure we see that s converges as fast as possible to zero in the
cooperative game if both cost-functionals have an equal weight in case ν>0.
So, under these parameter conditions both players have an incentive to co-
operate, since cooperation increases the adjustment speed of the closed-loop
system (19) towards its long-term equilibrium. On the other hand in case
ν<0, s converges as fast as possible to zero in case either ω =0o rω = ∞.
One might expect that cooperation under these parameter conditions will be
12much more diﬃcult to achieve. For, whatever the value of the cooperation
weight parameter ω is, both players observe that a diﬀerent value of this
parameter would increase the stability of their economy. Obviously, this is
a desirable property as it implies that unanticipated shocks will have a less
serious impact on the economy.
3.3 The Eﬀect of Fiscal Stringency Conditions on λ
The impact of ﬁscal stringency is measured by the model parameter χ.I n
section 3.1 we analyzed already the consequences of ﬁscal stringency on the
number of non-cooperative equilibria. We saw that if the model parameter
r is smaller than one, ﬁscal stringency has no impact on the number of equi-
libria. There is always a unique equilibrium. However, in case r>1ﬁ s c a l
stringency does have an impact. If ﬁscal stringency conditions are either
rather weak or very strong, again a unique equilibrium will occur, whereas
if ﬁscal stringency is in between a lower and upper bound, χ1 and χ2,e i t h e r
two or no equilibrium can occur.
In section 3.2 we showed that in case the sign of the parameter ν is negative,
one may expect that cooperation will be diﬃcult to achieve. In fact this
happens if and only if (2ar(φ2 − 1
2η)−bφ1)(a2µ(r2 −1)−χ)−2a2bφ1µr(r +






In other words there is always a threshold after which, if ﬁscal stringency
is increased even more, the realisation of a cooperative equilibrium will be
more diﬃcult to achieve. Tight ﬁscal stringency conditions imply that the
domestic government is rather reluctant in using ﬁscal instruments to sta-
bilize domestic output and prices. Since the foreign country has the same
attitude both countries are very reluctant to help out the other country in
the achievement of an optimal performance. Note that in case r<1
3, irre-
spective of the other parameter values, always ν<0 holds. In that case,
foreign deﬁcits have only a limited eﬀect on domestic output (see (10)) and
a cooperative equilibrium between both countries will be diﬃcult to achieve
if countries care about the internal stability of their economy (i.e. prefer a
high adjustment speed λ).
Next, we analyze the impact of ﬁscal stringency conditions on the closed-loop
dynamics of the system under both scenarios. In Table 3 we show the impact
13of χ on the closed-loop dynamics of the model under the assumption that
r<1. Details of the calculations are given in Appendix IV.
Table 3
χ Non-Cooperative Cooperative
0 λ = 1
2θ λ = 1
2θ
: increasing increasing/(decreasing)
large λ = −auc λ = −auc
Here auc := φ2− 1
2θ. The table should be interpreted as follows. If χ increases,
the corresponding λ for the non-cooperative case increases (monotonically)
from 1
2θ to −auc. For the cooperative case two diﬀerent situations can occur
depending on the sign of σ := −bφ1(1+ω)2 +2aauc(rω2 −2ω +r). If σ>0,
λ will increase (monotonically) in the cooperative case too. In case σ<0,
λ will ﬁrst increase towards its maximum value (larger than −auc)a n dt h e n


















From Table 3 and Figure 3 we see that the adjustment speed of s towards its
long-term equilibrium always increases in case ﬁscal deﬁcits are taken more
seriously, at least in the non-cooperative case. In the non-cooperative case
the adjustment speed increases with higher values of χ: it reduces ﬁscal pol-
icy activism and therefore the negative externalities of national ﬁscal policies
that occur when the dynamic system starts out of equilibrium. In the non-
cooperative case these externalities are less activated by the players in case
14the ﬁscal stringency requirements are imposed with more vigour, i.e. if χ
is set higher, because with a higher valued χ the costs of high deﬁcits and
surpluses increase and policy activism is therefore reduced. E.g. if s(0) > 0,
country 1 has an initial competitive advantage compared to country 2 and
would like to reduce output and inﬂation by means of a ﬁscal surplus, this
however also has a contractionary eﬀect on country 2 whose economy is in
recession already because of the initial disequilibrium and would suﬀer even
more from a contractionary ﬁscal policy in country 1.
In the cooperative case the convergence speed is larger than in the non-
cooperative case: in case of an initial disequilibrium of the state variable
s, the negative spillovers from national ﬁscal policies are internalized when
ﬁscal policies are set in a cooperative manner. In that case there exists,
however, a threshold after which this convergence speed does not increase
anymore (though it remains above that of the non-cooperative case). In case
ﬁscal deﬁcits are taken strongly into account, implying that χ is large, the
impact on the convergence speed of s towards zero is almost the same in both
scenario’s. Note that this is also the case if in both scenario’s ﬁscal deﬁcits
are (almost) neglected. Note also that if ω =1 ,σ is always positive and the
monotonic relation between χ and λ applies. In case ω approaches either
zero or inﬁnity, implying that cooperative policy design is dominated by one
country only, the case with σ<0 applies and there exist some value for χ
for which the adjustment speed is maximal.
Summarizing, we see that the adjustment speed of output price diﬀerential
is higher in the cooperative case than in the non-cooperative one. Further-
more, if ﬁscal stringency would be a design parameter, we observe that for
a high adjustment speed it is best to increase ﬁscal stringency conditions as
much as possible in case countries are non-cooperative (that is try to prevent
the individual players to intervene in the economy) and if countries are co-
operative, there exists some intermediate level of ﬁscal stringency where the
adjustment speed is maximal (provided the model parameters satisfy σ<0).
Moreover, in case ﬁscal deﬁcits play either no role or a very important role it
does not make any diﬀerence for the adjustment speed whether the countries
cooperate or not.
153.4 Consequences of a European Federal Transfer Sys-
tem
It is well-known (see e.g. Weber, 1991, Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1993, Bay-
oumi and Prassad, 1995, and Christodoulakis et al. 1995) that asymmetric
macroeconomic shocks are fairly important in most countries of the Euro-
pean Union. Furthermore, Decressin et al. (1995), ﬁnd that labor mobility is
considerably smaller in the EU than in the US. Therefore, a European Fiscal
Transfer System (EFTS) that aims at stabilizing aymmetric shocks in the
EMU has been advocated by van der Ploeg (1991) and has been elaborated
further by e.g. Italianer et al. (1993) and von Hagen (1995).
In this section we will include such an automatic stabilization rule into our
model and analyze its consequences. In the context of EMU a ﬁscal transfer
system operating through the budget of the EU seems to be the most real-
istic institutional framework, e.g., in the form of an EU-wide unemployment
beneﬁts scheme.
To that end we deﬁne net government expenditures as follows




where z :=  (y−y∗) is a net transfer from country 1 to country 2. The transfer
system redirects demand from a country with a higher level of output to a
country with a lower level of output. Thus, the transfer system contributes
to automatic stabilization of intra EU divergences in output ﬂuctuations.
Note that transfer systems in practice may induce negative incentives in that
countries postpone adjustment measures in expectance of receiving transfers
(consider e.g. the Mezzogiorno problem in the case of Italy where sustained
transfers from North to South hampered structural adjustments in the South
and created strong dependence from the South on the North). Our analysis
-which deals with symmetric countries and cyclical ﬂuctuations- disregards
such incentive problems associated with ﬁscal transfer systems 1.






1Welfare costs associated with a ﬁscal transfer system could be introduced by adding
z to the welfare functions (13),(14) implying that higher transfers are more costly.
16After some elementary calculations we have that this model can be rewritten
into the previous framework, with the following redeﬁnition of parameters:
a :=
ηX













in which X := 1 − γξ + η  and Z := ρ + η .
Using these parameter redeﬁnitions all results obtained in the previous sec-
tions can be applied now. Some elementary calculations show that the pa-
rameters a,b,φ1 and φ2 are in absolute terms smaller and k is larger than
in the original model, while c remains constant. The consequence of the
introduction of an EFTS for our model are, see (10)-(12), that due to the
direct output transfers divergences between both countries are automatically
stabilized. In the EFTS case, therefore, less national ﬁscal policy activism
is needed to stabilize output deviations. The role of the indirect stabiliza-
tion mechanism via output price diﬀerentials (s) becomes less important.
Consequently, initial output price diﬀerentials will be more persistent. In
particular, if we recalculate the eigenvalue λ for the (non-)cooperative case
we obtain the following result:
Table 4
χ old model model with EFTS
0 λ = 1







1−γξ+ρ+2η  + 1
2θ
From this table we see that the adjustment speed of output price diﬀer-
ential towards its long-run equilibrium is lower in the EFTS model if ﬁscal
stringency conditions are tight ( χ →∞ ).
4 Numerical Simulations with the Model
A numerical example is very useful to illustrate the main aspects of the
workings of the model and the analytical results established in the preceed-
ing section. For the model parameters we take the following values
17Table 5: Model Parameters
δ =0 .2 ζ =1 θ =0 .15
γ =0 .4 ξ =0 .25 ω =1
ρ =0 .4 α =2 iE(t)=¯ iE =0
η =1 β =5 s(0) = 0.05
κ =1 χ =2 ,5
Figure 4 graphs the adjustment dynamics that result in the non-cooperative
(solid line) and cooperative case (dotted line).
[Insert Figure 4]
Under ﬁscal policy coordination, adjustment of the state variable, s(t) (panel
(e)), is faster than under non-cooperative ﬁscal policies. Compared with un-
coordinated ﬁscal policies, ﬁscal policy coordination leads to less contrac-
tionary ﬁscal policies in country 1 (panel (a)) and to less expansionary ﬁscal
policies in country 2 (panel (c)). A less contractionary ﬁscal policy in coun-
try 1 leads to more output ﬂuctuations in country 1 (compared with the
non-cooperative case) but contributes to stabilizing the economy of coun-
try 2 which is facing a recession. Under cooperation these externalities of
ﬁscal policies are internalized in the design of optimal ﬁscal stabilization
policies, producing more eﬃcient policies than in the non-cooperative Nash
case. This is also indicated by the welfare losses of both players, according
to (13)-(14), which are calculated in the ﬁrst row (I) of Table 6, both for the
non-cooperative case (a) and cooperative case (b)
Table 6: Welfare losses
18JF JF∗
I (a) 0.412 0.412 non-coop
(b) 0.368 0.368 coop
II (a) 0.013 0.013 non-coop χ =0
(b) 0.533 0.533 non-coop χ =5
III (a) 0.011 0.011 coop χ =0
(b) 0.474 0.474 coop χ =5
IV (a) 0.368 0.368 coop ω =1
(b) 0.302 0.470 coop ω =0 .5
V (a) 0.308 0.308 non-coop   =0 .3
(b) 0.246 0.246 coop   =0 .3
I: base scenario for (a) the non-cooperative and (b) the cooperative case.
II: eﬀect of either less (a) or stronger (b) interpretation of ﬁscal stringency
in non-cooperative case.
III: similar as in II but now for cooperative case.
IV: eﬀect of reducing bargaining weight player 2 in cooperative case.
V: eﬀect of ﬁscal transfer system (  =0 .3).
A stricter interpretation of the Maastricht restrictions on ﬁscal deﬁcits re-
duces ﬁscal activism leading to more pronounced output ﬂuctuations in the
EMU. To analyze the eﬀects of a higher degree of ﬁscal stringency on ﬁscal
policies and macroeconomic adjustment in the EMU, we compare outcomes
in two cases: (i) χ = 0 (solid line) and (ii) χ = 5 (dotted line). Figure 5
compares both cases under non-cooperative ﬁscal policy design. It turns out
that the results for the cooperative case are similar. We, therefore, choose
to plot these outcomes not separately.
[Insert Figure 5]
A higher degree of ﬁscal stringency reduces ﬁscal policy activism (panel (a)
and (c)) in both countries both under non-cooperative and cooperative ﬁscal
policy design, implying larger short-run output ﬂuctuations (panel (b) and
(d)), and consequently high welfare losses. As noted in section 3.3, the ad-
justment speed of the system dynamics increases when the degree of ﬁscal
19stringency is increased. In our example, the eﬀects from a change in ﬁscal
stringency on ﬁscal deﬁcits and output turned out to be somewhat stronger
in the case of policy coordination (not shown). Rows II and III of Table 6
display the welfare losses that result in the non-cooperative and cooperative
case with no ﬁscal stringency (χ = 0, line (a)) and with high ﬁscal stringency
(χ = 5, line (b)).
In the case of ﬁscal policy coordination, the weighting parameter ω -t h a t
can also be interpreted as the relative bargaining strength of country 2 in
the cooperative decision making process - plays an important role as it deter-
mines how much weight is attributed to the preferences of both countries in
policy design. In Figure 6 the eﬀect of reducing ω from 1 (solid lines) to 0.5
(dashed lines) is displayed. Note that we have assumed again that χ =2 .5.
[Insert Figure 6]
With ﬁscal policies being more oriented to the needs of country 1 we in par-
ticular see a less expansionary ﬁscal policy in country 2 (panel (c)), which,
therefore, faces larger output ﬂuctuations (panel (d)), whereas country 1 fea-
tures more stable output (panel (b)). The adjustment speed of the state
variable s(t) is slightly higher when ω is reduced to 0.5 (panel (e)). As noted
in section 3.2, we are therefore in a case where ν<0. According to row IV
of Table 6, welfare losses are redistributed from country 1 to country 2 when
its bargaining power increases.
As discussed in section 3.4, a system of (federal) ﬁscal transfers may be a use-
ful stabilization tool in a monetary union that features strong asynchronous
business cycle ﬂuctuations. To illustrate the workings of the transfer system
we consider in Figure 7 the adjustment dynamics in case   =0 .3 (assuming
again χ =2 .5a n dω = 1) in case of non-cooperative (solid lines) and coop-
erative (dashed lines) ﬁscal policies.
[Insert Figure 7]
Comparing with Figure 4, we ﬁnd that the ﬁscal transfer system provides sub-
stantial automatic stabilization, resulting in lower output ﬂuctuations (panel
20(b) and (d)) and less need for ﬁscal stabilization at the national level (panel
(a) and (c)). Not visible, but shown in section 3.4, is a reduced adjustment
speed of the system dynamics when a federal transfer system is introduced.
According to row V of Table 6, the transfer system enables to reduce welfare
losses substantially compared to the base case of row I that features no ﬁscal
transfer system. In that perspective, the introduction of the ﬁscal transfer
system in a setting with asynchronous business cycle ﬂuctuations and ﬁscal
stringency conditions at the national level can be deemed as eﬃcient.
5 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the design of ﬁscal policies under EMU. Under EMU,
countries loose monetary and exchange rate policies as macroeconomic sta-
bilization tools. Therefore, the entire burden of stabilization is shifted to
national ﬁscal policy adjustment. A symmetric two country model of the
EMU with sluggish output and price adjustment in the short run was con-
structed. We modeled the design of ﬁscal stabilization policies in the EMU
as a linear quadratic diﬀerential game between national ﬁscal authorities. In
this game we analyzed the Nash open-loop and the cooperative equilibria.
Of course, to keep our analysis tractable, we had to impose a number of
restrictions. The next limitations of the analysis should be noted: (i) a
symmetric two-country EMU was modeled and the interaction with non-
EMU countries neglected; (ii) only Keynesian eﬀects of ﬁscal policy were
present in the model and intertemporal implications of the government bud-
get constraint were ignored; (iii) we focussed on open-loop Nash equilibria
and Pareto solutions assuming quadratic preferences and an inﬁnite time
planning horizon and (iv) a passive (non-strategic) ECB was assumed con-
trolling the common nominal interest rate.
Within this framework it was shown how ﬁscal stabilization policies were di-
rected at stabilization of the business cycle ﬂuctuations. The eﬀects of a set
of externally imposed constraints on ﬁscal ﬂexibility, such as those involved
in the Stability Pact, were studied in detail. In general, the ﬁscal stringency
criteria reduce the degree of ﬁscal policy activism and by that the degree of
eﬀective stabilization of output and prices in the EMU. In that perspective,
these constraints are causing suboptimal macroeconomic policies. We also
showed that ﬁscal stringency may have an impact on the number of non-
cooperative equilibria and on the internal stability of the economy. For the
21non-cooperative case stability increases if ﬁscal stringency increases, whereas
for the cooperative case there may exist a threshold for ﬁscal stringency af-
ter which stability decreases again. For the cooperative case we looked in
more detail at the eﬀects of the bargaining power on the internal stability
of the economy. It turned out that internal stability is either maximized or
minimized with symmetric bargaining shares. Though, obviously, the sum of
welfare losses is minimized if bargaining shares are symmetric the loss of in-
ternal stability might be a reason for the occurrence of a diﬃcult bargaining
process. We showed that such a situation always occurs if e.g. ﬁscal strin-
gency exceeds a certain threshold or if foreign deﬁcits have only a limited
direct eﬀect on domestic output.
Finally, the eﬀects of a ﬁscal transfer system in the EMU were considered.
We showed that such a system decreases the internal stability of the econ-
omy. On the other hand, we showed in an example that welfare costs may be
considerably reduced using such a transfer system. So, when national ﬁscal
policies are restricted such a transfer system may be a powerful stabilization
instrument in the presence of business cycle divergences.
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Appendix
I. The noncooperative case
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is invertible we recall from Engwerda et al. (1999) the following result.
Consider the case that we restrict ourselves to consider only control func-
tions which yield ﬁnite cost and which, moreover, permit a feedback syn-
thesis. Then, if both (A,B1)a n d( A,B2) are stabilizable and Qi is pos-
itive deﬁnite w.r.t. the controllability subspace <A , B i >, the inﬁnite-
planning horizon two-player linear quadratic diﬀerential game has for ev-
ery initial state an open-loop Nash equilibrium strategy if and only if there
exist K1 and K2 that are solutions of the algebraic Riccati equations (see










are all situated in the left half com-
















where Φ(t,0) satisﬁes the transition equation ˙ Φ(t,0) = AclΦ(t,0); Φ(0,0) =
I,is an open-loop Nash equilibrium strategy. Furthermore the corresponding
cost are xT















































































































To calculate (both theoretically and numerically) the optimal policies in the
open-loop Nash equilibrium we use the Hamiltonian approach.
In Engwerda et al. (1999) the next algorithm is provided to calculate all
equilibria for this inﬁnite planning horizon game.
Algorithm 1:
• Step 1: Calculate the Hamiltonian matrix M :=

 



































































• Step 2: Calculate the spectrum of matrix M. If the number of posi-
tive eigenvalues (counted with algebraic multiplicities) is less than the
number of state variables, n, goto Step 5.
• Step 3: Calculate all 2-dimensional M invariant subspaces K for which
Re(λ) > 0 for all λ ∈ σ(M|K). Calculate 3 2x2 matrices X, Y and









 = K. Consider only those K for which X is
invertible. If this set is empty, goto Step 5.
• Step 4: Let K be an arbitrary element of the set determined in Step 3.

















24is an open-loop Nash equilibrium strategy. The spectrum of the corre-










σ(−M|K). If the set determined in step 3 contains more elements one
can repeat this step to calculate diﬀerent equilibria.
• Step 5: End of algorithm.












































































   








in which α3 := −{(aucα2
1 +2 µabφ1α1)(auc + 1
α1µabφ1(1 − r)) + 2φ2
1µb2χ}.
Note that the square root term always exists as a real number, since this










It is easily veriﬁed that the ﬁrst two entries of the eigenvector corresponding
to the eigenvalue p are zero. Moreover, the ﬁrst entry of the eigenvector
corresponding to the eigenvalue 1
2θ is always zero as is the second entry of
the eigenvector corresponding to λi, i =1 ,2. From this immediately follows
that the model has at most 2 diﬀerent equilibria. Moreover, by calculating
the exact structure of the eigenvalues corresponding to the eigenvalues 1
2θ and
λi, and using the above computational algorithm the closed-loop structure
25can be determined, as summarized in (16).










It is now easily veriﬁed that if k>ρthe parameters a and α1 are positive
and α3 is, consequently, negative. So, M has exactly 2 positive eigenval-
ues. In case k<ρ ,t h e na<0. So there will be exactly one equilib-
rium if either α1 < 0a n d( 4 δξ + θ(k + ρ))2χ<
µη2θ(θk+2δξ)
ρ−k or α1 > 0a n d
(4δξ + θ(k + ρ))2χ>
µη2θ(θk+2δξ)
ρ−k .D e n o t i n g ( 4 δξ + θ(k + ρ))2χ by ¯ y1 and
µη2θ(θk+2δξ)
ρ−k by ¯ y2, it is moreover easily veriﬁed that there exists no equilib-
rium in case α1 < 0a n d¯ y1 > ¯ y2, and that there are two equilibria in case










by χ2 we can rewrite these conditions in terms of
inequalities that should be satisﬁed by the design parameter χ. That is, there
is one equilibrium if either χ<min(χ1,χ 2)o rχ>max(χ1,χ 2); there is no
equilibrium if χ1 <χ<χ 2; and there are 2 equilibria if χ2 <χ<χ 1.W e
summarized these results in Table 2.
II. The cooperative case



















(1 + ω)µb2 (ω − 1)µbc (1 − ωr)µab (r − ω)µab
(−1+ω)µbc (1 + ω)µc2 (−1 − ωr)µac (−r − ω)µac
(1 − ωr)µab (−1 − ωr)µac (1 + ωr2)µa2 + χr (1 + ω)µa2





Factorization of W immediately yields then the following parametervalues
for the matrices Q, S and R:
Q =
 
(1 + ω)µb2 (ω − 1)µbc




(1 − ωr)µab (r − ω)µab





(1 + ωr2)µa2 + χr (1 + ω)µa2
r(1 + ω)µa2 (r2 + ω)µa2 + ωχ
 
.
Note that in our case matrix R is invertible. Furthermore, (A,B) is stabiliz-
able and (Q,A) is detectable.
From Lancaster and Rodman (1995, chapter 16) we recall that the optimal


























The corresponding minimal cost are xT
0Kx0.
To calculate the optimal policy for the cooperative game one can proceed now
similarly as in algorithm 1 of Appendix I (see e.g. Lancaster and Rodman
1995, chapter 7). The only diﬀerences are that M must be replaced by
H :=
 
−(A − BR−1ST) BR−1BT
Q − SR−1ST (A − BR−1ST)T
 
;
step 3 yields a unique solution; and that K := YX −1 is obtained similarly






Substitution of the above mentioned parameter values into H yields after
some tedious manipulations, the following eigenvalues for this Hamiltonian:
{1
2θ,−1









2 + µχ{−2(1 + ω
2)aauc(2(1 − r







By calculating the eigenvectors corresponding to the eigenvalues 1
2θ and λ,
and using algorithm 1 the closed-loop structure (19) results.
27III. A detailed study of the parameter ν
By deﬁnition ν = ν1ν5 − ν2ν4 + ν3ν4 +2 ν5ν3. This can be rewritten as
ν =( ν1 +2 ν3)ν5 +( ν3 − ν2)ν4
=4 [ 2 aµ(1 − r
























2 − 1) − χ) − 2a
2bφ1µr(r +1 ) ]
The last equality can be veriﬁed, e.g., by straightforward expansion of both
sides of the equation and then comparing terms.
Since 16µχbφ1(χ + a2µ(1 + r)2) > 0, the conclusions concerning the sign of
ν follow directly.
IV. Sensitivity analysis of the closed-loop eigenvalues w.r.t. χ
By substituting χ =0a n dχ = ∞ into the λ s one obtains the numbers
m e n t i o n e di nT a b l e3 .
To analyze the intermediate behavior we consider the derivative of both λ s
w.r.t. χ. First consider the non-cooperative case under the assumption




1 − 4α3},w h e r e
c1 := (1 + r)µabφ1 (see 22). For analysis purposes we rewrite α1 as q1 + χ
and α3 as −1













































1 − 4α3 + p1(c2
1 − 4α3) − 1
2(p1α1 + p1χ + p2)(p1χ + p2)
 
c2
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1 − 4α3 + c1)+1
2(p1χ + p2)(p1α1 − p1χ − p2)
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1 − 4α3 + c1)+1
2(p1χ + p2)(p1q1 − p2)
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From this it is clear that dλ
dχ > 0 if we can show that p1q1 − p2 > 0. Substi-
tution of the modelparameters into this expression (see Table 6) yields (note
that by assumption r<1, i.e. k>ρ )
sgn(p1q1 − p2)=sgn{






(k2 − ρ2)2 −
µθη2(θk +2 δξ)




(k + ρ)2(4δξ + θ(k + ρ))
2 − (θk +2 δξ)θ}
= sgn{
k
(k + ρ)2(8δξθ(k + ρ)+1 6 δ
2ξ
2) − 2δξθ}
Next, we show that this last expression is always positive. To do so, we ﬁrst
note that since k>ρ ,w eh a v e2 k>k+ ρ. Therefore, k
(k+ρ)8δξθ − 2δξθ >
1
28δξθ − 2δξθ > 0. Using this inequality, the claim is obvious now. Which
proves the positiveness of dλ
dχ for the non-cooperative case.
Next, we consider the cooperative case. Some elementary analysis shows that
in that case the corresponding λ (see 25) can be rewritten as
λ =
 
d1χ2 + d2χ + d3
d4χ2 + d5χ + d6
,
29where di,i =1 ,..,6 are pointed out in Table 6.








e1χ2 +2 e2χ + e3
(d4χ2 + d5χ + d6)2,
where ei,i=1 ,2,3 are simple expressions in di (see either Table 6 or below).
To analyze this derivative we ﬁrst consider the sign of the parameters e2 and
e3. By deﬁnition we have that





2(−bφ1 + aauc(r − 1))
Furthermore, by ﬁrst substituting the appropriate modelparameters into di
and next comparing terms on both sides of the equality signs we obtain




3[bφ1(1 + 2rω + ω
2) − 3bφ1(rω
2 +2 ω + r)+
2aauc(r − 1)(rω




3[bφ1(1 − r)(1 + ω)
2 +2 ( aauc(r − 1) − bφ1)(rω
2 + r +2 ω)].
From the above expressions we see that both e2 and e3 a r ep o s i t i v ei fw ec a n
show that (aauc(r − 1) − bφ1) > 0. Using the deﬁnition of these parameters
it is easily veriﬁed that (aauc(r − 1) − bφ1)=
1
2θη
k+ρ, from which the above
inequality follows. So, both e2 > 0a n de3 > 0.
Finally, we consider e1. Some elementary rewriting shows:
e1 = d1d5 − d2d4
=1 6 ωµbφ1(−bφ1(1 + ω)
2 +2 aauc(rω
2 − 2ω + r))
So, denoting −bφ1(1 + ω)2 +2 aauc(rω2 − 2ω + r)b yσ,w eh a v et h a te1 =
16ωµbφ1σ.
Note that the sign of the derivative is completely determined by the sign of
e1χ2+2e2χ+e3. Using the above derived information concerning the signs of
ei,i=1 ,2,3 it is clear that if σ>0, dλ
dχ > 0 for all χ>0, and that if σ<0,
dλ
dχ will be positive for small χ and becomes negative if χ is large. From this
the conclusions w.r.t. the behavior of λ as a function of χ summarized in
Table 3 and Figure 3, respectively, are obvious then.






auc φ2 − 1
2θ
α1 (1 − r)µa2 + χ
α2 (1 + r)µa2 + χ
α3 −((aucα2
1 +2 µabφ1α1)( auc + 1









d2 µ{−2(1 + ω2)aauc(2(1 − r2)aauc +4 ( 1+r)bφ1)+( 1+ω)2(2aauc +2 bφ1)2}
d3 (aµ)2ω{2(1 − r2)aauc +4 ( 1+r)bφ1}2
d4 4ω
d5 8ωµa2(1 − r2)+4 r2µa2(1 + ω)2
d6 4ωµ2a4(1 − r2)2
e1 d1d5 − d2d4
e2 d1d6 − d4d3
e3 d2d6 − d3d5
k 1 − γξ
µ αξ2 + β
ν1 (aµ)2{2(1 − r2)aauc +4 ( 1+r)bφ1}2 +4 χ2a2
uc
ν2 µχ(2aauc +2 bφ1)2
ν3 2µχaauc(2(1 − r2)aauc +4 ( 1+r)bφ1)
ν4 4(χ + µa2(1 − r2))2
ν5 4µχr2a2

















σ −bφ1(1 + ω)2 +2 aauc(rω2 − 2ω + r)
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